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Abstract — V2G model goes beyond V2C model and 
proposes an entrepreneur’s personal view of the risks and 
returns as compared to that of the firm’s risks-return trade-
offs. At the growth stages, the partnership of co-entrepreneurs 
and VC or IPO also means risk sharing for the original 
entrepreneur or founder. Larger group of founders and early 
stage actors allow the entrepreneur to consider him or herself 
differently, even lower the “risk” of his or her job than the 
traditional entrepreneurs. V2G model combine the best parts 
of the roles as an entrepreneur (owner) and hired manager. 
Thus, in this case, it is not any more only “your” firm, but a 
rapidly-growing enterprise with the corresponding V2G 
mindset. This V2G mindset avoids negative effect of a single 
owner. The separation of the roles of the owner and manager 
will allow the entrepreneur-founder to adequately cope with 
them. In sum, V2G model points out three proposals: first, it 
examines risks and returns from entrepreneur’s individual 
viewpoint; secondly it explores risks and ambitions between 
individual and enterprise; and finally it describes the 
importance of the ownership development of the enterprise 
and development of the value of the enterprise. 
 
Keywords — entrepreneurship, growth venture, ownership, 
governance, Venture-to-Capital, V2C 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Growth Venturing 
The rapid rate of globalization and quickening pace of 
technological innovation expose new venture activity to 
fresh challenges. It is no longer logical to maintain that 
firms aspiring to grow focus on domestic growth first and 
on incremental internationalization later on. The increasing 
velocity of change in knowledge-intensive societies and 
firms may have also intensified the need for, and the speed 
of, growth at home and international markets at the same 
time. Despite these changes in business and society, the 
discussion around entrepreneurship has remained associated 
with niche marketing, limited business outlook, ad-hoc and 
intuitive strategies, lack of resources and capabilities as 
well as over-reliance on the owner-manager’s own initial 
competencies. The exceptions to these are the recent 
theoretical discussions and empirical findings regarding 
Born Globals and International New Ventures as well as 
V2C models (Venture-To-Capital) [among others e.g. 1, 2, 
3]. This paper will build on the latter research and model-
 
 
building tradition by proposing a framework for growth 
venturing (or Venture-To-Growth – simply V2G) that starts 
with V2C and focuses on influential issues that impact the 
rate and pattern of rapid growth. The V2G proposes four 
families of factors, the shortage of which adversely 
influence growth. We refer to each shortage as a “Gap” [4] 
and empirically examine eight in depth case-firms for their 
implications and insights.  
B. The Entrepreneurial Choice 
Historically, entrepreneurs have created jobs for 
themselves and family members, employment for others, 
and wealth for the family and their regions as a whole 
gradually. Creation and preservation of family wealth has 
been the primary objective over time. Etemad [5] suggests 
that most of the successful firms, which grew to become 
regional and international, were local family firms at the 
beginning. This traditional growth path goes back to the 
local artisans, merchants and traders on the famed Silk 
Road, dating to 500 to 1000 B.C., that dominated the Far 
East and Middle East before extending to the Greek and 
Roman empires.  
The examples of successful family firms, such as 
Medici’s, Farnese, Della Rovere’ (started in current Italy), 
Rothschild’s (current Germany), Armstrong’s, 
Chippendales and Parsons (current England), Ford, 
Carnegies and Rockefellers (the US) started from humble 
beginnings at home and expanded to their respective 
continent and beyond. The initial patriarchs of these 
families, similar to a host of others, were entrepreneurs: 
they aspired to create jobs, income and wealth for 
themselves, family, and then for others. However, not all 
family firms go on to become large international 
companies.  
There comes a time that the initial entrepreneurs face the 
entrepreneurial choice between status quo, maintaining a 
secure and accomplished family firm in a steady-state, 
growing even further, or even bowing out. Thus not all 
family firms become the instrument of growth. Nor do all 
entrepreneurs become empire builders.  In the process of 
building a firm, family or otherwise, some entrepreneurs 
grow the family firm and become content with it. Others 
evolve to adopt entrepreneurship as a way of life or a life-
time challenge and vocation. They go-on to become the 
builders of many new firms of their own choosing. They 
may even become serial or “professional” entrepreneurs 
and co-entrepreneurs at their own volition; and thereby 
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bring the much-needed wealth of knowledge, experience 
and social networks to a new start-up firm. In that process, 
they overcome many of the traditional shortcomings 
associated with the fresh and young entrepreneurial start-
ups. Naturally, they bridge many gaps and chasms on the 
road to building growing companies at much faster pace, as 
they do not loose time to mistakes and set-backs.  
On the other side of the coin, aspiring ventures also face 
the choice in the selection of their entrepreneurial team: 
e.g., between the team that aims for IPO as exist and the 
one that can help the firm to that rise beyond IPO and aims 
for V2G. This main objective of this research is to examine 
a range of such entrepreneurial choices, especially within 
the proposed V2G framework.  
II. NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Gap Reduction Approach 
A fundamental assumption underlying the growth 
venturing (or venturing to growth or V2G) is that actors in, 
and around the growth venture, including the owner-
managers, are committed to growth because of their belief 
that the growth objectives of the venture are more important 
than those of the entrepreneur [6]. However, without the 
entrepreneurial drive, dedication and commitment, which 
can be viewed analogous to a strong sense of ownership, a 
start-up would face even greater difficulties. The desire of 
some (traditional) entrepreneurs, mainly as a “lonely-rider” 
type or in family-owed and run firms, are to primarily 
secure personal or family wealth as opposed to growing the 
wealth of the venture. Thus, not all or majority of the new 
companies do want to grow fast. It is possible to argue that 
when there is one entrepreneur, or very few in the 
entrepreneurial team, both the entrepreneur(s) and the firm 
grow together. However, the presumed theoretical 
discordance between their respective objectives may 
eventually lead to diverging trajectories. Such discordance, 
if not divergence, in the extant literature suggests that there 
exists potential shortcoming(s) in both the mindset and the 
required qualities of the starting entrepreneurs in the 
beginning for the growth venturing to proceed. This 
suggests that there exists a combination of Entrepreneurial-
Managerial Gap. However, the venture may face other 
shortcomings as well. The venture's ability to grow is 
undoubtedly dependent on its ability to add sufficient 
managerial capacity to manage the growth processes 
[among others e.g. 7, 8, 9]. This suggests that enterprise 
may face a problem in the delivery of adequate 
entrepreneurial and managerial services to the firm, both of 
which are crucial to a venture's sustained long-term growth. 
It is also assumed that a venture grows faster when it has 
enough capital resources and capabilities of its own to do 
so; or it takes steps acquire them in order to narrow its 
Resource-Capability Gap. Naturally, it grows even faster if 
it has enough information and knowledge [10] or 
systematically narrows its Information-Knowledge Gap.  
Mason and Harrison [11] suggest that many ventures are 
unsuccessful in raising equity finance because they are not 
ready for receiving such investments. Similarly, Seppä and 
Näsi [3] state that “it is ironic that there is no shortage of 
capital now; but there is a shortage of small-enough doses 
of it”, which point to the presence of the Equity Gap. When 
the company’s stocks are intended for acquiring necessary 
resources and capabilities for further growth, this intention 
influences the ownership structure of the company. Stated 
differently, the founder-manager can utilize their 
entrepreneurial capital to access to incremental financial 
and knowledge resources; and thereby reduce both the 
resource-capability and knowledge-information gaps. Such 
injection and usage of equity helps the firm to develop 
quicker for becoming a publicly-traded company. However, 
the classical story of an entrepreneurial firm suggests that 
the entire authority over the venture is at the founder’s 
command; or one person has all the authority and makes all 
the crucial decisions. In such cases, there is bound to be 
gaps between requirements of the new investors and the 
owner-entrepreneur. Therefore, the governance principles 
must be consistently developed to enable faster growth. 
This Structure-Governance Gap can be viewed in more 
reflective light as “a structure-conduct-governance” 
paradigm, where the changes in equity capital or ownership 
structure influence the governance principles of the 
enterprise. Ownership also tends to determine the balance 
of power between shareholders. Such balance reinforce the 
goals and risks of the shareholders, which in turn influences 
the nature of decisions and impacts firm’s strategies and 
consequent growth rates [6].   
B. Venture-To-Capital (V2C) 
Seppä [12] illustrated “the VC spiral” that results in the 
growth in size of the average venture capitalist (VC) funds 
raised by a successful VC and in the consequent growth of 
the minimum amount of investment as well. Thus, the 
capital gap problem relates to the distance between a 
prospective venture and an investable venture. As stated 
earlier, Seppä and Näsi [3] observe that there is a shortage 
of small-enough doses of capital. Thus, family and personal 
savings remain the most important source of start-up 
funding, with venture capital playing a greater role in the 
early growth phase rather than in the start-up phase [13, 
14]. Firms with a relative lack of tangible assets appear to 
be financed through less formal means, where non-bank 
financing (loans from individuals unrelated to business) 
plays a more important role in the capital structure of the 
start-ups. This emphasizes the importance of network 
resources in this type of ventures [15]. 








































FIGURE 1: THE KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION GAP [16] 
 
Rasila, Seppä and Hannula [16], and Rasila [17] 
introduced the equity gap that suggests the minimum 
investment limit is too high for young ventures. The reality 
of the equity gap (see Figure 1) can be seen as a negative 
phenomenon, as a shortage of adequate financing in the 
early stages of the life cycle. The equity gap is obvious and 
problematic for new ventures which seek rather small initial 
investment. As noted earlier, one strategic management 
implication of the Penrose effect [7] is that a fast-growing 
organization tends to stagnate due to managerial limitations 
(e.g., a part of the Entrepreneurial-Managerial gap). Thus, 
there is also a shortage of managerial competences, 
attention and time. This is called knowledge gap here (see 
Figure 1). 
 
FIGURE 2: V2C MODEL [3] 
 
Seppä and Näsi [3] described a V2C model which is 
distinguished from playing solo (where the lone 
entrepreneur owns all the shares) and pushed by VC 
models. This Venture-To-Capital (or simply V2C) model 
described the basic orientation of growth venturing, where 
distribution of ownership is faster than the other two 
models because ultimately the ownership is widespread 
anyway (e.g. IPO, MBO and LBO). On the other hand, the 
width of the “gaps” calls for efforts to create a new 
professional actor. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the 
space for V2C to fulfill in the process of accelerating 









FIGURE 3: THE EXPECTED TRAJECTORIES OF VALUE OF THE 
FIRM OVER TIME [16] 
 
The role of the entrepreneur is still vital but not as 
dominant as in the traditional view of growth venturing. In 
the context of growth venturing, it is assumed that a venture 
grows faster when it has enough capital of its own to do so. 
Naturally, the venture is not expected to grow rapidly 
without additional investments. Therefore, a venture grows 
even faster if it is also accelerated by V2C (Figure 3), 
which operates between the inception of a venture and the 
moment when it becomes attractive to formal venture 
capital financing. The V2C operative fills especially “the 
knowledge gap” or, as Penrose [7] called it, “the managerial 
limitations”.  
 
C. Different Entrepreneurial Risks and Mindsets 
Growth venturing is risky business in which stakeholders 
invest time, knowledge and money. In addition, various 
players are involved in the venture with different goals and 
attitudes to risks. For this study, the most interesting actors 
are, first and foremost, entrepreneurs (including founders), 
co-entrepreneurs, business angels and venture capitalists. 
They are deeply involved in the venture investing time, 
money and knowledge. They also carry the risks, but they 
reap the anticipated benefits.  
For other players, such as banks, there are different tools 
to manage risks and, therefore, they do not necessarily 
absorb large risks. For the entrepreneur, the risk means 
walking away from a secure job and a career path. 
Although in the modern world, there is no longer such a 
thing as a career path of secure jobs. In addition, starting up 
a firm could be the only way to get a job. Personal risk also 
means that an entrepreneur is taking her or himself and her 
or his family into an unfamiliar storm of stress and 
uncertainty. However, for other players, this is just a job or 
a hobby. For professional stakeholders, risk management is 
a part of their job and they have a set of tools at their 
disposal for managing it (e.g. investment criteria, 
continuous monitoring and portfolio management).  
Risk and investment in the venture influence the mindset 
of the strategy makers. Indeed, non-owner managers need 
to show their position, which explains their tendency to 
favor riskier growth strategies than their non-managerial 
counterparts [18]. On the other hand, an entrepreneur might 
choose the best for the family and not the best for the 
venture. In general, investments can be considered as 
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investment of money and knowledge (time). 
Traditionally, there have been main types of 
entrepreneurs, ranging from life-style entrepreneur to 
traditional entrepreneur and serial or professional 
entrepreneurs. As entrepreneurs evolve, they learn how to 
transfer a part of the undesired risks inherent in 
entrepreneurial venture to others. For example and as 
discussed earlier, the entrepreneur in a start-up situation has 
no choice to bear the entrepreneurial risk  personally as the 
young firm has no capacity to absorb it. A traditional view 
of the entrepreneur represents this situation, which is 
depicted in the south east quadrant of Figure 4.  
With growth, however, the firm can begin to absorb more 
risks and the entrepreneur can transfer a part of the 
entrepreneurial risk to the firm. Life-style firms, where the 
entrepreneur manages the firm in a stable and steady 
fashion, bear all the risks. They populate a part of the 
South-West quadrant in Figure 4. Naturally, growth 
exposes both the firm and the entrepreneur to additional 
risks. While professional and serial entrepreneurs mange 
risks in a comfortable zone (depicted at the centre of Figure 
4) and possibly transfer their personal risk exposure to the 
firm (as in the North-West quadrant of Figure 4), the 
speculative-type growth may not be able to do so. Growth 
in this type firms exposes the entrepreneur to large risks (as 
depicted in the North-East quadrant of Figure 4). Stated 
differently, entrepreneurs face different family of choice 
and they conduct themselves differently, which results in 
placing their respective firms in different positions in 
Figure 4. We will use this framework to further explore 

















FIGURE 4: A SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF FOUR POSSIBLE 
STATES OF PERSONAL-COMPANY RISK TRADE-OFFS BASED ON 
RANGE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL CHOICE. 
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND FINDINGS 
A. Methods 
The empirical evidence of this research consists of eight 
in-dept and longitudinal case studies of rapidly growing and 
internationalizing young enterprises (RIEs) in Canada. 
These cases are selected from the six annual public lists of 
the Profit’s “Top100 Fastest Growing Enterprises in 
Canada”, spanning over the years 2000 to 2005. These lists 
are well-known and rank the growth of Canada's 
entrepreneurial companies annually, based on the growth in 
revenue over a five-year period to avoid temporary 
fluctuations. Firms included in this study have grown very 
rapidly by any standard. Their average five-year growth 
rate is over 9800% (or over 150% on annual basis) and 
median internationalization is over 80% of gross revenue. 
Although, the inclusion of only publicly-held companies in 
the study could be viewed as a limitation, we decided in 
favor of completeness and accuracy of publicly-held 
information (such as public securities documents and 
information filed by public companies and investment 
funds with the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) in 
The System for Electronic Document Analysis and 
Retrieval filing system) as it enables us to examine and 
better understand the role of the ownership in the resource-
constrained start-ups. The methods include careful criteria 
for selection of diverse RIEs to ensure broader applicability 
of findings. The selected vital statistics of each case-firm, 
based on in-depth and longitudinal development of the 
cases from the inception, spanning between six to 12 years, 
are highlighted in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 






























2,570% $35 million 1996 1999 
4.Extreme 
CCTV Inc. 



















9,647% $64 million 1996 1996 
 
B. The Impact of Electronic business: E-Commerce is” 
business as usual” for RIEs 
The empirical examination of case-firms reveals 
innovative, yet with theoretically consistent strategies, 
portraying patterns, which explain the entrepreneurial 
mindset in these younger rapidly growing firms. Consider 
the following selective examples. The central common 
business platform that supports AirIQ’s telematic-related 
services on which the prevailing position of a mobile asset 
is stored, and from which, that position is reported (or 
further processed) is web-based or Internet-assisted. This 
allows mobile clients to access and transfer that information 
to their mobile devices easily and regardless of their 
location. Therefore, once the client has become part of the 
system, the Internet acts as the distribution channel for 
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machine-to-machine transfer of telematic information.. The 
Internet-Based Facilities (IBFs) and Technologies (IBTs) 
have enabled AirIQ to expand beyond the traditional 
channels for delivering its (telematic) services on real time 
and continuous basis practically everywhere. The extensive 
use of the IBFs and IBTs have allowed AirIQ to bridge the 
time and space that have traditionally acted as barriers, 
especially to smaller and younger firms for providing 
services on demand everywhere as such smaller younger 
firms cannot establish a physical presence earlier-on in their 
lives. 
Pethealth’s own IBFs and ITBs enable pet owners to 
conveniently subscribe to Pethealth services, pay their 
premiums and register a claim all on-line. Similarly, 
veterinary clinics can report pet’s health status and place an 
expense claim online and avoid the paper work and waste 
of time conveniently. In fact, the Internet and customized 
IBFs and ITBs have at least complemented, and in some 
cases substituted for, some functions of the distribution 
channels with little regard for the timing and the location of 
the pet, pet owner, veterinary clinics and other buyers and 
suppliers. Pethealth services are available at all times where 
there is access to the Internet. In that process, they have 
bridged over time and distance and subsumed the mode of 
entry discussions by default. Pethealth’s information 
databases that support all of its services can be viewed as its 
common business platform is also online. 
Carmanah uses multiple and parallel channels for 
communication (e.g., interactive web-site, 1-800 number as 
well as local agents and distributors) from which a 
customer can choose depending on his preferences and 
needs. This is a typical pattern of information dissemination 
and distribution channel in rapidly-internationalizing firms. 
In light of e-commerce-enabled and interactive web-sites, 
the traditional concept of mode of entry has lost their 
conventional importance. Clients decide as to which 
channel to use and then the firms IBFs and IBTs assist and 
augment the process. 
Although electronic commerce (E-Commerce) is central 
to AirIQ’s and Pethealth’s business models, their own 
customized IBFs and IBTs also play crucial and 
complementary roles in their respective E-Commerce 
platforms. In practically all RIEs in our samples, E-
Commerce has become the “business as usual”, especially 
when electronic business is integrated with the legacy 
systems, especially in the older industries such as guarding 
(e.g., in case of case-firm Garda). In fact, the role of E-
Commerce is even more pronounced when it comes to 
knowledge-intensive businesses as well as services that can 
be delivered in digital formats. Once the firm meets the 
challenge of transforming its business to a digital format 
and deploys an E-Commerce platforms, it can offer them at 
all times and everywhere with the help of its own IBTs and 
IBfs that also enable further customization and adaptation 
to customer needs. Our in-depth case studies points to 
presence of E-Commerce platform augmented with each 
firms’ own customized IBTs and IBFs in all of the RIEs in 
the study.  
C. Gap reduction findings 
All studied cases went public very early in their life cycle 
when the firms were relatively small (average revenue 
under $4 million and median $2,4 million). This finding 
suggests that publicly-raised equity were used to remedy 
the young firm’s constrained resources, which has 
historically impeded these firms’ growth. Consider, for 
example, that the publicly-raised funds could be used for 
acquiring productive resource early-on, which implies that 
the mindset and the governance structures of these 
companies had evolved beyond a single shareholder in 
favor of a smaller stake in a growing and larger company. 
This transformation has three immediate advantages:  
i) the firm avails itself for relatively-inexpensive public 
funds earlier, which allows it to acquire the necessary 
resources and capabilities earlier and relatively cheaply and 
thus bridge its Resource-Capability Gap sooner and faster 
than relying on private sources of funds.  
ii) The preparation for early IPO puts the firm on 
different footing regarding its management and governance 
structure as the entrepreneur or the initial entrepreneurial 
team prepares to become publicly accountable sooner with 
a profound positive impact on the firm’s governance in the 
early stages for early listing. And,  
iii), this re-orientation is bound to have positive effect on 
closing the Structure-Governance Gap as well. Another 
potential benefit of earlier listing is that it may influence the 
founders or co-entrepreneurs to bring experienced people 
on board earlier. Most of the entrepreneurs and co-
entrepreneurs of our case-firms were highly-experienced 
and successful entrepreneurs and executives in their prior 
engagements. Most of them had founded their firm by 
harnessing the social capital of their social network in terms 
of acquisition of financing, attracting strategic partners and 
even in engaging key executives. Our Case-firms suggest 
that this earlier changes help to bridge the Entrepreneurial-
Managerial Gap sooner and faster. Combined, the closure 
of the gaps could out the firm on a higher growth trajectory. 
The growth path of our case-firms clearly deviates from 
the trajectory of young firms based the conventional 
principle of entrepreneurial independence and strongly 
gravitates towards interdependence, synergy and symbiosis 
[19]. Consistent with that practice, the case firms have also 
integrated newly-acquired competences (e.g., their senior 
owner-executives) with the existing internal capabilities of 
the firm and thus augmented their combined social capital, 
further enhanced theirs social network and the 
corresponding market knowledge and position as well as  
their customer base. It also appears that most of these RIEs 
combine multiple advantages and deploy a few dominant 
theoretically-sound growth patterns, which are highly 
information- and learning-intensive and customer-oriented, 
resulting in much faster reduction of the Information-
Knowledge Gap. Their overall growth patterns, however, 
do not easily fit into the extant growth or 
internationalization theories.  
D. Findings #1: Personal view  
Our data of RIEs contains 10 primary founders or co-
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entrepreneurs with have significant amount of shares and 
central influence in the development of the firm’s rapid 
growth. Eight were CEO’s and two in the executive 
position such as VP Operations and VP Sales.  
The average compensation of Profit Listed companies 
were $288,231 in 2001 [20]. According to Statistics 
Canada, the average salary for senior management 
personnel in Canada was $100,950 per year in 2000. In UK 
the average salary of a director of a small company (up to 
£5m turnover) was £58 000 (about $133,000) in 2002 [21]. 
This information shows that the case companies’ top 
executives (mainly CEO) earn more or less same (average 
$132,000 and median $91,000) than average SME 
executive in the year before IPO, but much more than 
managers in an average SMEs after the IPO (i.e., on 
average $286,000 vs. $101,000). Also, the median of 
salaries ($195,000) goes above average top executive’s 
salary only one year after IPO. In the fifth year after IPO, or 
listing, the average annual salary and bonuses are about 
$350,000 with the median of $279,000. 
The specific information from case-firms is more 
revealing. For example, the founder-director of TLC Vision 
Inc. average returns were about $850,000 (from year before 
IPO and for the next six years) versus the average annual 
income of $140,000 for typical doctors in most provinces as 
estimated by the Canadian Federation of Medical Students. 
Thus, his annual compensation was 5-6 times higher than 
the average doctor’s annual income in Canada after 
graduation.  
The average returns of another founder and CEO (of the 
TLC Vision inc. with a BBA Certificated Accountant) was 
about $450,000 vs. the average salary for CAs with 
approximately 10 years' experience of $103,500, according 
to the latest salary survey [22]. However, the salaried 
partner drew about $142,500 in Ontario in 2005 [22]. 
Hence, on average, the TLC Executive’s annual salary and 
bonus was three times higher than those with his education 
level.  
Consider Garda World Security, which issues new 
options every year. Ten per cent (10%) of the Common 
Shares of the capital stock of the Corporation that is 
outstanding from time to time is reserved for the issuance 
of stock options pursuant to the stock option plan of the 
Corporation. Garda’s founder-CEO annual salary and 
bonuses were $135,000 in third year after listing and 
$883,000 in the sixth year. CEO’s non-exercised options 
value at the end of the fiscal year 2005 was $4 million 
(300 000 shares). In addition, he still hold 4,9 million 
shares (19 %). At present his stock value is over $110 
million (evaluated at $22.50, stock based on the Last Trade 
At 9/26/2006 3:55pm). The cumulative shareholder’s value 
on $100 investment in the August 1999 in Garda’s common 
shares was $3,500 at the end of 2005. These evidences from 
cases lead us to use the framework of risk-firm-
entrepreneurial choice trade-offs of Figure 4 to propose the 
corresponding one pertaining to the personal view of risks 
and rewards in the V2G model (see Figure 5). The list of 
the significant states and their corresponding descriptions 
are as follows: 
• A – Foundation of the growth venture 1 (nascent 
entrepreneur or serial entrepreneur) 
• A’ – Foundation of the growth venture 2 (serial 
entrepreneur) 
• B – Comparison level as a director in SME (salary) 
• C1 – Failure of the growth venture 1 before IPO 
• D1 – Successful IPO of the growth venture 1 
• A” – Foundation of the growth venture 3 (serial 
entrepreneur) 
• C2 – Failure of the growth venture 1 after IPO 
• D2 – Successful growth of the company’s value 
(exercised options) 





Salary, bonus, stock 
























FIGURE 5: ENTREPRENEURS SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
TRAJECTORIES 
E. Findings #2 Risk of the entrepreneur and firm 
The highlights of case-firms’ growth path can be 
summarized in the following observation (forming a highly 
realistic scenario, as follows):  
i) The original founder’s average ownership share 
declines from 35% (highest ownership stake is 45%) before 
listing to 21% in the year of IPO and to less than 14% in 
five years after IPO with the median of 10% (due the initial 
founders selling shares to co-entrepreneurs and investors or 
the corporation issues new shares over time).  
ii) As a consequence and at the same time, they lowered 
their personal risks as well as company risks when they 
capitalize their “entrepreneurial capital” as venture capital 
injections helps firms to weather the storm and survive 
much better than otherwise. 
iii) The firm had raised funds from VC or stock market 
via IPO and private placements as early as possible. VC’s 
role, which was more important in the seed and start-up 
stages, became less important in the growth stage. At the 
high growth stage the ventures were able to raise funds 
from banks as the earlier success worked as collateral. 
Funds from banks were certainly cheaper than those from 
VC (for example, 6,5 % interest rate from Royal Bank of 
Canada than 12 % from VC in the case of AirIQ Inc.).  
The important finding, based on the above evidence, is 
that the serial or “professional entrepreneurs” (e.g., Region 
A in Figure 6) are exposed to a higher risks, but they do not 
absorb personal risk. A typical traditional entrepreneur 
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(e.g., Region B in Figure 6) is assumed to be risk-averse 
and later raise its commitment. The “life-style 
entrepreneurs” (e.g., Region D in Figure 6), is practically 
bearing “no” personal risk as it is transferred to the firm. 
Consequently, the general presumption regarding an 
entrepreneur appears to have limited applicability in the 
context of the framework presented in Figure 4. The 
findings of this research and discussions supports the risk 
Trade-off framework presented in Figure 6, with a brief 
description of the significant states highlighted in the 















FIGURE 6: THE EXPECTED MOVEMENTS IN PERSONAL-
COMPANY RISK TRADE-OFFS MATRIX. 
  
Legends: 
• A: Serial or Professional entrepreneur balancing the 
personal risks in order to involve with riskier growth 
businesses. Over time, the company risk reduces as 
along with that of the entrepreneur’s. 
• B: The risk-averse “traditional” entrepreneur’s personal 
and company risks is decreased systematically and 
incrementally. 
• X: The entrepreneur could get involved in riskier 
business (C), when the entrepreneur feels sufficiently 
secure or the trajectory B steadily continues toward 
position D.  
• C: The sense of security could lead the entrepreneur to 
engage in more risky business (Y).   
• D: The life-style entrepreneur is self-employed without 
high growth ambitions. 
F. Findings #3 Towards V2G model 
The empirical evidence suggests the rapidly-growing 
younger firms: (i) expand their ownership base earlier; (ii) 
they also go public early-on and; (iii) IPO is not the main 
exit route for entrepreneurs, V2C actors or even venture 
capitalists (VC). Thus, the shareholders’ exits is realized 
mainly through holding stock that can be traded on the 
stock exchange incrementally, which run counters to the 
Solo, VC and V2C models proposed by Seppä & Näsi [3] 
and Rasila [17]. IPO and listing on stock exchanges seem to 
be a working mechanism for early stage financing, 
incremental and partial exit for all stakeholders, incentives 
for entrepreneurs and V2C actors and a measure of early, 
but not the ultimate, success. The V2G model of the 















FIGURE 7: V2G MODEL 
 
Our findings suggest that founders reduce their personal 
risks by exchanging part of their ownership stake for higher 
salaries (especially after the IPO), stock options and partial 
exits during the growth (as depicted in Figure 6). 
Consequently, founders will gradually face similar 
incentives to those of the co-entrepreneurs as well as the 
hired managers, which support long-term commitment and 
the separation of the key roles (manager, director and 
owner). This evolution is actually required by the formal 
and institutional investors and it resonates with good 
governance principles requested by stock exchanges. Thus, 
the Structure-Governance-Paradigm and the separation of 
the roles (manager, director and owner) are fundamental 
elements of the rapid growth ventures beyond V2C. This is 
the essence of the proposed “Venture-to-Growth”, or V2G 
for short, based on the in-dept study of RIEs. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In sum, V2C model’s focus is on early success of the 
new venture so that it can reinforce the continuous growth 
in the future. The V2C model is developed mainly from the 
investor’s perspective. Overall, this perspective seems to 
neglect both the entrepreneurs’ position and the purpose of 
the venture to become a real growth company. When V2C 
actors operate only between the seed stage and the formal 
venture capital industry, this could lead entrepreneurs, co-
entrepreneurs and other stakeholders to attain a short term 
financial gains and become short term-oriented; with the 
prospects of longer term gains remaining uncertain. In order 
to avoid the short-term perspective and gains among the 
stakeholders, the grand exit should be avoided.  
V2C model is probably applicable for most of the growth 
companies; but for true RIEs or “global gazelles”, it is too 
narrowly defined as intermediate actors and intermediating 
stage.  Similarly, the formal role of venture capitalist is not 
convincing in RIE cases, because the traditional exit routes 
(IPO or trade sale) are not the preferred exists any more as 
the actual growth can be financed by the financial 
institutions (e.g., bank loans). Thus, there is more room for 
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formal and institutional investors (e.g., Small Capital 
Investment Funds).   
V2G model goes beyond V2C model and proposes an 
entrepreneur’s personal view of the risks and returns as 
compared to that of the firm’s risks-return trade-offs. At the 
growth stages, the partnership of co-entrepreneurs and VC 
or IPO also means risk sharing for the original entrepreneur 
or founder. Larger group of founders and early stage actors 
allow the entrepreneur to consider him or herself 
differently, even lower the “risk” of his or her job than the 
traditional entrepreneurs. V2G model combine the best 
parts of the roles as an entrepreneur (owner) and hired 
manager. Thus, in this case, it is not any more only “your” 
firm, but a rapidly-growing enterprise with the 
corresponding V2G mindset. This V2G mindset avoids 
negative effect of a single owner. The separation of the 
roles of the owner and manager will allow the entrepreneur-
founder to adequately cope with them. In sum, V2G model 
points out three proposals: first, it examines risks and 
returns from entrepreneur’s individual viewpoint; secondly 
it explores risks and ambitions between individual and 
enterprise; and finally it describes the importance of the 
ownership development of the enterprise and development 
of the value of the enterprise as depicted in Figure 7. 
The public policy implication should not be lost on those 
who formulate growth-oriented policies or whose policies 
impact growth of younger and smaller enterprises. As an 
example of such policies, formal investors and private 
individuals should be encouraged to invest in earlier-on 
IPO than what is advocated by the VC community. 
Similarly, the environment must allow, if not cover, for 
early IPO as an instrument of raising public funds for 
growth as opposed to financial exit for the VC community. 
Unfortunately, public policy authorities seem to lag 
behind what is actually needed and thus neither aspiring 
firms benefit from public-support program; nor can they 
leverage such support to create employment and wealth 
even faster than what they have already achieved. 
Naturally, the formulation of a family of conducive policies 
not only can help these V2G enterprises (that we call hasty 
gazelles). Their rapid growth may also stimulate other 
similar smaller firms to create employment, innovation and 
wealth even faster than their larger counterparts and with 
higher velocities than ever before. Simply stated, the 
preponderance of a policy environment capable of 
supporting rapid growth (i.e., an average 9800% in five 
years) versus normal growth (e.g., 5% to 10% annually to 
result in 20% to 45% in 5 years) should not be lost (see 
Figure 8). Similarly, there is strong need for understanding 
lessons from the pattern of the case firms’ processes, 
practices and strategies [for more details see 5, 23, 24, 25, 
26]. 






FIGURE 8:  A COMPARATIVE TRAJECTORY OF GROWTH FOR 
V2C, V2G AND LONELY WALK. 
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